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Abstract
This paper begins with a puzzle regarding Lewis’ theory of radical interpretation.
On the one hand, Lewis convincingly argued that the facts about an agent’s sen-
sory evidence and choices will always underdetermine the facts about her beliefs
and desires. On the other hand, we have several representation theorems—such as
those of (Ramsey 1931) and (Savage 1954)—that are widely taken to show that if
an agent’s choices satisfy certain constraints, then those choices can suffice to de-
termine her beliefs and desires. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ conclusion
is correct: choices radically underdetermine beliefs and desires, and representation
theorems provide us with no good reasons to think otherwise. Any tension with
those theorems is merely apparent, and relates ultimately to the difference between
how ‘choices’ are understood within Lewis’ theory and the problematic way that
they’re represented in the context of the representation theorems. For the purposes
of radical interpretation, representation theorems like Ramsey’s and Savage’s just
aren’t very relevant after all.
Introduction
Karl is an ordinary human being, with ordinary human beliefs and ordinary human
desires. Our task is to work out what Karl’s beliefs and desires are. The catch is that
we cannot help ourselves directly to any facts about Karl’s inner mental life, or indeed
about any mental states whatsoever, including our own. On the other hand, we are
allowed to know any and all facts about his physical constitution, environment, ancestry,
possible futures, and counterfactual histories, that may be relevant—but only inasmuch
as these are expressed without invoking any concepts that might raise question marks for
physicalism. Given only that much as our starting point, we’re to derive what we can of
the facts about Karl’s beliefs and desires. Call this the project of radical interpretation.1
There’s no shortage of views on how we might approach this project, but I happen to
think that the kind of strategy put forward by Lewis in ‘Radical Interpretation’ (1974)
and developed in later works (1979; 1980a; 1983a; 1983b; 1986; 1994) is basically on the
right track. I’ll say more the Lewisean view in due course, but for now let’s just say that
it rests on two main ideas: that beliefs and desires can be characterised by reference
∗E.J.R.Elliott@leeds.ac.uk. Draft of February 12, 2021.
1 In (Lewis 1974), the project of radical interpretation also relates to meanings in language. We won’t
be interested in that part of the project in this paper.
to their typical roles within folk psychology, especially in relation to sensory evidence
and choices; and that folk psychology is more or less Bayesian in character—beliefs and
desires come in degrees, choices are determined by something like the rule of expected
utility maximisation, and learning works by something like the rule of conditionalisation.
From the beginning, though, Lewis held that substantive constraints on the contents
of our beliefs and desires would be required for any adequate functional definition of
those states. The clearest argument he gives for this is in ‘New Work for a Theory of
Universals’ (1983a: 373–5; see also 1986: 36ff, 105ff). Assume that Karl is indeed as the
folk psychological theory describes him—an expected utility maximiser who condition-
alises on his sensory evidence. From this it follows that, whatever the facts about Karl’s
life history of evidence and choices might be, there will be at least one way of assign-
ing beliefs and desires to him that fits those facts perfectly. However, Lewis argues, if
there are no substantive constraints on what kinds of beliefs and desires Karl can have,
then there will be a great many competing interpretations as well. Mere fit with the
evidence-and-choice facts radically underdetermines the belief-and-desire facts. Lewis’
solution was to cut some systems of belief and desire from the running: only the most
eligible systems of belief and desire are genuinely possible.
But now you might be wondering whether this ‘eligibility’ solution was really neces-
sary. After all, don’t we have a number of representation theorems for expected utility
theory—such as those of Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1954)—which are widely taken
to show that if an agent’s choice patterns satisfy certain axioms, then there’s a unique
system of graded beliefs and desires under which those choice dispositions maximise
expected utility? And if that’s what these theorems really do tell us, then if Karl really
is an expected utility maximiser, it follows that if his choices satisfy those axioms, then
the facts about his choices alone could in principle suffice to determine his beliefs and
desires. So much for Lewis’ underdetermination claim!
Indeed, these theorems have long been taken to support a certain kind of approach
to radical interpretation, one that emphasises the importance of choices in particular.
Buchak (2013: 83ff) describes this as the ‘interpretive use’ of representation theorems,
while Meacham and Weisberg (2011) refer to it as ‘Characterisational Representation-
alism’. But whatever we choose to call it, the usual idea is that a person’s (graded)
beliefs and desires just are those under which her choice dispositions maximise expected
utility, at least in the event that they satisfy the appropriate axioms. Ramsey and Sav-
age developed their own theorems partly in the service of this idea, and in the years
since theorems like theirs have played a starring role in several ‘interpretivist’ theories
of graded belief (e.g., Maher 1993; see also Bermúdez 2009). Others still have suggested
that representation theorems provide us with the foundations for defining graded beliefs
in terms of their functional relationships with choices according to decision theory (e.g.,
Cozic and Hill 2015).
So we have what appears to be a conflict. Assume for the sake of argument that
Karl is a rational Bayesian agent. Lewis then tells us that there will be radically distinct
systems of belief and desire that equally fit the facts about Karl’s evidence and about his
choices, whatever those facts may be; a fortiori, the facts about his choice dispositions
alone must underdetermine the facts about his beliefs and desires. But then there’s the
representation theorems, which are widely taken to show that under the right conditions
the facts about Karl’s choices alone can in principle be enough to determine the facts
about his beliefs and desires—indeed we might not even need to consider his life history
of evidence. What should we make of all this?
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That’s the set-up, now here’s where I’m going with it: Lewis was not wrong, but then
neither are the representation theorems. There is no genuine conflict between Lewisean
underdetermination and theorems like Ramsey’s and Savage’s—the appearance to the
contrary is the result of a widespread misunderstanding about what those theorems can
plausibly tell us about the relationships between choices, beliefs, and desires. As we will
see, the key to reconciliation lies in the difference between how ‘choice dispositions’ are
understood in Lewis’ theory, and the problematic way they’re treated by ‘interpretive
uses’ of representation theorems. More importantly, once we see why Lewisean underde-
termination is consistent with the representation theorems, we can learn a lot not only
about Lewis’ approach to radical interpretation, but also about the relevance of repre-
sentation theorems to the project of radical interpretation more generally—if I’m right,
then it’s a mistake to think that representation theorems can be used ‘interpretively’.2
Let me be as clear as I can: my goal here is not to defend Lewis’ underdetermination
claim against an objection arising from representation theorems. Lewis does not need my
defence. Rather, the point of the paper is to address two questions about the relationship
between representation theorems and radical interpretation:
(i) How do these theorems relate to Lewis’ underdetermination result?
(ii) Are there any plausible theories of radical interpretation under which these theorems
show that beliefs and desires are (sometimes) determined by choice dispositions?
My answer to the former is ‘they don’t really’, my answer to the latter is ‘probably not’,
and I come by my answer to the latter by way of considering the former.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four main parts. I will start with an
outline of Lewisean functionalism in §1, and then in §2 I will present the underdetermi-
nation argument. In §3 I will describe how representation theorems are consistent with
Lewis’ argument. In this section I will also describe why pre-existing discussions on this
matter—such as those in (Schwarz 2012; 2014) and (Williams 2016)—are insufficient.
Finally, in §4 I describe why the ‘interpretive use’ of representation theorems is prob-
lematic, and why they are therefore ultimately of little direct relevance to the project
of radical interpretation. (There is also a short Appendix, which addresses several small
issues with Lewis’ underdetermination argument that are tangential to the main thread
of discussion.)
1. Lewisean Functionalism
I will start with some ‘big picture’ matters on Lewis’ functionalism and its relationship to
Bayesianism (§1.1), after which I’ll outline in more detail what a Bayesian functionalist
theory ought to look like (§1.2–§1.3).
1.1 The big picture
Our task as radical interpreters is to identify states of belief and desire with the physical
states that constitute our world. We can do this by specifying a scheme of interpreta-
tion—that is, a function from physical states S, S′, ... (e.g., brain states) to the mental
states M,M ′, ... with which they’re to be identified (cf. Lewis 1983b: 119).
2 So there’s no confusion: in this paper we’re interested in representation theorems for expected utility
theory, which are like Ramsey’s and Savage’s. By this I mean exactly those theorems that state sufficient
conditions under which a binary relation can be given an expected utility representation, and one that is
unique (or at least unique up to some non-trivial condition). It should go without saying that there might
be a representation theorem of some form or other that could be relevant to radical interpretation—it
would be quite amazing if there weren’t! But, rather than saying ‘theorems like Ramsey’s and Savage’s’
over and again, from now on I’ll just say ‘representation theorems’.
3
The functionalist about beliefs and desires has a certain methodology for arriving
at the correct scheme(s) of interpretation. She starts with some theory of intentional
psychology, call it T , which tells us
i) what kinds of contents it is possible to believe and/or desire; and
ii) how states of belief and desire relate to one another, other relevant mental states,
and the world (e.g., via the senses and behaviour).
The idea is to use this theory T to determine the best scheme (or schemes) of interpre-
tation. To the extent possible, such a scheme
i) should assign mental states that are eligible for assignment according to T ; and
ii) it should fit in the sense that if S, S′, ... are assigned to M,M ′, ... respectively, then
the S, S′, ... relate to one another and to the wider world in the same way that the
M,M ′, ... relate to one another and to the wider world according to T .
A scheme is considered better to the extent that it assigns eligible interpretations and
maximises fit, and we say that the correct scheme is whichever is best. If T is true,
then at least one scheme is guaranteed to assign eligible contents and to have perfect
fit; otherwise, we make do with what we can get. If there are multiple schemes tied for
equal best, then the usual thing is to say that truth is indeterminate between them (e.g.,
Lewis 1983b: 120).
Given this very schematic characterisation, we can distinguish several more specific
varieties of functionalism by reference to characteristics of the underlying theory T . The
first is one of Lewis’ core commitments throughout his career:
Analytic Functionalism: T is a systematisation of folk psychology.
The ‘systematisation’ is important: to whatever extent we have a shared implicit un-
derstanding of intentional psychology, it is likely be at least a little messy, perhaps
incomplete, and maybe even inconsistent. So what we’re really after will be a systematic
reconstruction of folk psychological thinking—with the holes filled in, the inconsistencies
smoothed over, and the messiness tidied up. The idea, in other words, is to define beliefs
and desires in terms of their functional roles within the best systematisation of folk psy-
chology properly so-called. (Cf. Jackson 1998 on functionally defining moral concepts
using hypothetical future systematisations of folk moral theories.)
Next up is a style of functionalism that Lewis advocated from at least (1980a) on-
wards (see also 1983b; 1986: 39–40):
Anti-Individualist Functionalism: T is about typical agents.
That is: the theory places no specific constraints on properties and relations that any
individual’s beliefs and desires will have, but rather on how we might expect beliefs and
desires to typically be.3 Functional roles are typical roles, so a scheme of interpretation
identifies mental states with physical states on the basis of how the latter typically
behave. Karl is said to be in the mental stateM just in case he happens to be in a physical
state S that’s assigned M by the correct scheme of interpretation—i.e., regardless of
whether in Karl’s particular case S behaves anything at all like M typically behaves.
Finally, we have:
3 In (Lewis 1980a; 1983b; 1986: 39–40), ‘typicality’ is understood statistically. So, roughly, a state S
will be interpreted as a certain system of beliefs if, across the actual and possible individuals in which S
recurs, S tends to have the kinds of causes and effects we associate with that system of beliefs. I’m not
sure this is the best way to understand the relevant sense of ‘typicality’, but what I have to say won’t
depend very much on the matter so I’m going to leave it ambiguous.
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Bayesian Functionalism: T is more or less Bayesian in character.
In Lewis’ case, Bayesian functionalism is a consequence of his commitment to analytic
functionalism, given that any good systematisation of folk psychology ‘should look a lot
like Bayesian decision theory’ (1979: 533–4). As he put it in ‘Radical Interpretation’,
[Bayesian] decision theory (at least, if we omit the frills) is not esoteric sci-
ence, however unfamiliar it may seem to an outsider. Rather, it is a system-
atic exposition of the consequences of certain well-chosen platitudes about
belief, desire, preference, and choice. It is the very core of our common-sense
theory of persons, dissected out and elegantly systematised. (1974: 337–8)
Not exactly like orthodox Bayesian theory, mind you, but not too far from it either. Lewis
clearly thought that the more extreme idealisations of Bayesianism would be absent
from any final systematisation of folk psychology (cf. 1983a: 375; 1986: 30; 1994: 428),
and we know that some of these idealisations can be weakened without fundamentally
changing the recognisably Bayesian character of the resulting theory (e.g., Jeffrey 1983;
Walley 1991; Weirich 2004; Bradley 2017; Elliott 2017b). With that said, three potential
misunderstandings are worth briefly addressing.
First, ours is a theory of the typical agent. Like the rest of us, Karl will be atypical to
some degree in some relevant respect at least some of the time. So we should expect that
he will deviate from Bayesian norms to some degree—perhaps even to a very significant
degree (Lewis 1983b; 1994: 428).
Second, not all idealisations are inherently problematic: any psychological theory will
sacrifice some realism for greater generality and overall simplicity, and there’s no good
reason to think that the best systematisation of folk psychology would be any different.
The truth of Bayesianism (qua theory of the typical agent) is not a precondition for the
success of Bayesian functionalism. Close enough is good enough. So we can live with a
bit of unrealism, especially if that’s the price we pay for greater generality and simplicity.
Finally, you might worry that folk psychology cannot be much like Bayesianism,
since Bayesianism is obviously not ‘platitudinous’. But we do not require that our sys-
tematisation of folk psychology be constituted from platitudes that members of the folk
would themselves spontaneously assert, or even readily recognise as things that they
themselves tacitly believe. For one thing, the expression of a theory may be couched
in technical jargon with which average members of the folk may be unfamiliar (Lewis
1974: 338). More importantly, the folk’s tacit understanding of intentional psychology
can be likened to our tacit understanding of grammar, involving complicated rules and
principles that need not be apparent even to those who unfailingly adhere to them (Lewis
1994: 416; cf. Jackson and Pettit 1990: 33–6).
To summarise, then, to be a Lewisean functionalist about beliefs and desires is to
be an anti-individualist analytic Bayesian functionalist. The Lewisean functionalist pro-
poses that our folk notions of belief and desire will refer to those states, if any there
are, which come close enough (and closer than anything else) to satisfying the func-
tional roles associated with the doxastic and conative mental states posited by the best
systematisation of our shared implicit understanding of typical intentional psychology;
and, furthermore, she’ll think that this systematisation will look a lot like contemporary
Bayesianism. The Bayesian theory we use to characterise the functional roles of our
beliefs and desires need not be perfectly accurate, and indeed we ought to expect it will
simplify and idealise over many of the messy details, but it is assumed that it will do a
fairly good job on average at least for typical agents.
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1.2 A model Bayesian
Our topic to start with concerns what the Lewisean functionalist ought to say about
underdetermination and representation theorems. It will help if we have a specific model
of a typical agent to serve as a fixed point of reference for the ensuing discussion.
With that in mind, let me now introduce Typikarl. Typikarl is perfectly typical with
respect to (i) the structure of his beliefs at a time, (ii) the structure of his desires at a
time; (iii) how his beliefs and desires change over time; and (iv) the relationship between
his beliefs, desires, and choices. Karl is not Typikarl. Like the rest of us, Karl will be
atypical in at least some of these respects to at least to some degree at least some of the
time—but not so our Typikarl, whose most unusual characteristic by far is that he is,
has been and always will be so uncompromisingly typical. Typikarl is a fiction, but he
will be a useful fiction for describing the typical functional roles of belief and desire.
My description of Typikarl will be based on a simplified ‘Jeffreyan’ conception of
decision-making (see Jeffrey 1965). Some of the arguments that follow—including the
underdetermination argument—will make use of the ‘Jeffreyan’ aspects, and I’ll say more
about that when the time comes. I emphasise, though, that my goal here is to describe
a model. We are not aiming for the ultimate systematisation of folk psychology, but
a simplified formal system that’s ‘close enough’ for drawing specific conclusions about
underdetermination. I discuss some of the simplifications in the Appendix.
Beliefs at a time
We’ll start by describing Typikarl’s beliefs and desires at a time. Any vaguely Bayesian
theory will require at minimum that beliefs and desires are in some sense graded, and
furthermore that they’re each coherent enough to permit the comparison of expected
values (Lewis 1974: 337).
I will assume that propositions are subsets of some set of possible worlds, Ω. For
simplicity, I’ll also assume that Ω is finite; consequently there are only finitely many
propositions with each belonging to ℘(Ω), the powerset of Ω. Also for simplicity, I will
assume that Typikarl has beliefs regarding every proposition. Given that, a nice and
familiar way to ensure a minimally coherent system of beliefs is to assume:
B-Eligibility: Typikarl’s beliefs at a time can be represented by a function B :
℘(Ω) 7→ R, which obeys the laws of probability.4
B-Eligibility sets a minimum bound on our eligibility constraints: only those systems
of belief that are representable by a probability function are eligible for assignment.
Note also that we’re taking the probability function to capture the content of a system of
beliefs as a whole. We are thus understanding ‘content’ more broadly than it’s sometimes
used—the ‘content’ of a system of beliefs is not a proposition, but a space of propositions
plus a measure of the strengths with which each is believed.
Desires at a time
With regards to Typikarl’s desires, we’ll want to start with his intrinsic values. We can
think of his intrinsic values as that aspect of his overall conative state that’s independent
of his beliefs, to be contrasted with that aspect of his conative state which is influenced
by his beliefs (e.g., by something like means-ends reasoning).
Within the Jeffreyan framework, intrinsic values will be most easily represented by
a distribution of real numbers over the worlds in Ω:
4 That is: B(Ω) = 1, and for all p, q, B(p) ≥ 0 and if p ∩ q = ∅ then B(p ∪ q) = B(p) + B(q).
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V-Eligibility: Typikarl’s intrinsic values at any time can be represented by a func-
tion V : Ω 7→ R.
You might usefully read V as representing the relative strength with which TypiKarl
desires that the actual world is ω, for each world ω in Ω.5
We can now talk about Typikarl’s desires more generally, which will be a function
of his beliefs and his intrinsic values. Say first that ‘Bp’ designates B conditionalised on
p; that is, for any p, q,
Bp(q) = B(q | p) = B(q ∩ p)
B(p) ,
if B(p) > 0; otherwise Bp(q) is undefined. We can then say that the strength with which
Typikarl desires a given proposition p is just the Bp-weighted average V-value of the
worlds that constitute p: ∑
ω∈p
Bp({ω})V(ω).
However, for our purposes all that really matters are Typikarl’s relative desires—his
preferences. So, if from now on we use ‘p % q’ to mean that Typikarl desires p at least
as strongly as he desires q, then we have:








Now for how Typikarl changes over time. We’ll assume, as Lewis usually did, that
Typikarl updates by conditionalising on his sensory evidence (cf. Lewis 1980b: 288;
1983a: 374; 1994: 428–9). To make this precise, let me introduce some more notation
and a couple of background assumptions.
First, we’ll let
τ =< τ1, ..., τn >
be an ordered set of times from the beginning of Typikarl’s life onwards. Then, we let
E = {e1, ..., en}
designate the set containing all and only those propositions which characterise—in all
relevant detail—all possible ‘streams’ of sensory evidence from any time to any later
time; for example, there is at τ1 the appearance of such-and-such shapes and colours
along with such-and-such sounds and such-and-such smells, etc., and then at τ2 the
appearance of ..., and so on.
Purely for technical convenience, we’ll assume that E includes Ω, the ‘trivial’ ev-
idence. (This merely helps to simplify some definitions below.) If we then say that B
is consistent with e just in case B(e) > 0, then we will assume that Typikarl’s initial
system of beliefs is consistent with every e ∈ E. That is, Typikarl doesn’t rule out any
5 As standard, I’ll assume that strengths of desire are measurable on nothing stronger than an interval
scale. Consequently, if V and V ′ are related by an interval-preserving transformation (i.e., if there’s an
x > 0 and a y such that for all ω, V(ω) = xV ′(ω) + y), then I will presume that V and V ′ represent the
very same intrinsic values, and I won’t be fussed about distinguishing between them.
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possible life history of sensory evidence prior to having had any experiences whatsoever.
(This just makes the underdetermination argument go through a bit smoother.) With
all that in place, the main driving force for psychological change is:
Conditionalisation. Typikarl’s beliefs at time τ are given by Bei , where Bi is his
initial system of beliefs and e characterises his life history of evidence up to τ .
We also have to describe how Typikarl’s desires change over time. Since Typikarl’s
beliefs will generally change as a result of his evidence, so too will his preferences tend
to shift and change about as time goes on. On the other hand, I will also assume:
Static Values. Typikarl’s intrinsic values do not change over time.
This assumption is implicit in a number of Lewis’ works (e.g., 1974: 336–7; 1980b: 288;
1983a: 374–5), and it is implicitly relied upon for his underdetermination argument. In his
(1983a: 375), Lewis claimed that it was a ‘dire’ over-simplification. By this I suspect he
meant that commonsense psychology allows that an agent’s intrinsic values can change,
not that they will, and certainly not that they will often. In any case, we stick with
Static Values for now. (I discuss the implications of denying it in the Appendix.)
Choice dispositions
Since Typikarl’s beliefs B and values V at any time jointly determine his total system
of desires at that time, from now on we’ll represent Typikarl’s total belief-desire state at
a time using pairs of the form (B,V). The only thing left is to describe how Typikarl’s
total belief-desire state at a time relates to his choices at that time.
It’s clear enough that if Typikarl were able to make any proposition whatsoever
true, and he knew this, then he would simply make it so that the actual world is what-
ever world he values most. But Typikarl does not have magical powers, and in fact
he probably has no direct influence over the truth or falsity of the vast majority of
propositions that he’s able to contemplate. So, before we can say anything very spe-
cific about Typikarl’s choice dispositions, we first need to fully characterise his options.
And that’s something I’m not going to do, since the matter raises tricky issues that
would swallow this paper whole long before we get around to saying anything about
underdetermination. A few general remarks will need to suffice.
To start, we will follow Lewis (1974: 337; 1994: 416–7) in treating Typikarl’s options
at any time as a partition of propositions specifying how he behaves at that time.6 Given
this, an initial thought for how we might model Typikarl’s options at a time τ would be
to use the partition
Bτ = {b1, ..., bn}
that captures in maximal detail each the specific ways b that Typikarl behaves at τ .
But this won’t work, since Typikarl needn’t have preferences over all of the b in Bτ . In
particular, if B(b) = 0, then b has no location within Typikarl’s preference ranking—
and if we didn’t have the simplifying assumption that Typikarl has beliefs regarding all
propositions, then it could well turn out that none of the b in Bτ find a place in his
preference ranking.
6 Arguably, agents decide between actions, not behaviours. If so, then this would present some po-
tential problems for the Lewisean approach to radical interpretation (cf. Williams 2019). But, with the
appropriate minor adjustments, Lewis’ underdetermination argument goes through either way, and the
points I raise in §3 and §4 are essentially unchanged if we replace all talk of ‘behaviours’ with ‘actions’.
So let’s set this aside as a matter to be dealt with elsewhere.
8
More generally, we’ve yet to consider the relationships between Typikarl’s options
and his beliefs. In the most basic version of Jeffrey’s decision theory, for example, a
proposition counts as an option only if it’s ‘actual’:
... we might call a proposition actual for an agent at a time if at that time
he can perform an act the direct effect of which will be that his degree of
belief in the proposition will [rationally] change to 0 or 1. Under ordinary
circumstances ... the proposition that the agent blows his nose is actual.
(Jeffrey 1968: 170)
Something similar has been advocated by Sobel (e.g., 1983)—roughly, p counts as an
option only if the decision-maker is certain she can make p true by an act of will. Related
conditions are discussed in (Hedden 2012) and (Schwarz forthcoming), and important
connections between options and beliefs are discussed in (Hausman 2000; 2012: 27ff).
I do not know whether we should want anything as strong as Sobel’s constraint
or Jeffrey’s ‘actuality’ constraint, but here’s not the place to decide the issue. What’s
important for our discussion is that there are plausibly some conditions on what counts
as an option and that these depend at least in part on what decision-makers believes
they can do. A minimal constraint, I take it, is that Typikarl won’t be disposed to
choose something that’s impossible by his lights. So we should say that p counts as
an option only if B(p) > 0. Furthermore—and this is the really important point—any
proposition about his behaviour that does count as an option at τ will be equivalent to
a disjunction of the more specific behaviour-propositions in Bτ . (This will be relevant
for the underdetermination argument in §2, and for some of the arguments noted in §3.)
Given this, we can say at a minimum that if Typikarl has beliefs B at τ , then his
options at τ will be set of a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions about
his behaviour at τ ,
OτB = {o∅, o1, ..., on}
where what we’ll call the null option, o∅, is the largest union of the b in Bτ such that
B(o∅) = 0. It won’t be located anywhere in Typikarl’s preference ranking. The remaining
non-null options o will each be equivalent to some union of b in Bτ , and will satisfy at
least the minimal condition B(o) > 0.7 We now have everything we need:
%-Maximisation: If Typikarl has beliefs and desires (B,V) at τ , then he will make
true some b in Bτ that entails one of the options in OτB that he desires most.
1.3 Fitness
To summarise: Typikarl’s beliefs and intrinsic values determines his desires, and his
total system of beliefs and desires at a time determines his choices and hence how he’s
disposed to behave at that time. Each system of beliefs and desires is also poised to give
rise to new systems of belief and desire by conditionalising on sensory input, and each
such system might itself come about from some earlier systems conditionalised on the
appropriate (possibly trivial) evidence.
7 I will assume henceforth that there’s always a unique such OτB that characterises Typikarl’s options
at τ , given that his beliefs at τ are B. What I’ve said so far in no way licenses this assumption, and it
may well be false. But it isn’t used in the underdetermination argument, and it only plays a simplifying








The only thing left is to say what a scheme of interpretation is, and what it is for a scheme
to maximise fit. It’s evident from how Lewis defines his ‘only constraining principle of
fit’ in ‘New Work’ (1983a: 374) that he was understanding schemes of interpretation
as functions from total momentary physical states to total systems of belief and desire
(B,V), and we’ll follow him in this regard. (The Appendix discusses the implications of
alternative ways of characterising schemes of interpretation.)
‘Fitness’ will need to be defined recursively, so start by saying that a total momentary
physical state Si matches an interpretation (B,V) just in case, for any e consistent with
B, the typical agent in Si given evidence e will come to be in some state Sj that brings
about b, where b entails some option o that maximises expected value with respect to
(Be,V). In visual form, the total momentary physical state Si matches (B,V) whenever,





where b entails o and o maximises expected value with respect to (Be,V).
Since we’ve assumed that E includes Ω, Si will match (B,V) only if Si itself gives
rise to behaviours that maximise expected value with respect to (B,V). However, to
say that Si matches (B,V) does not imply that Si will be assigned (B,V) by the most
fitting scheme(s) of interpretation, since we’ve said nothing to guarantee that the state
Sj that Si yields given e will itself match (Be,V). We need also that the interpretations
are aligned in the appropriate way in light of the causal relationships between the states
to which they’re assigned; thus,
Fit. A scheme of interpretation I fits iff, if I(Si) = (B,V), then:
(i) Si matches (B,V);
(ii) for any e consistent with B, if Si given e yields Sj , then I(Sj) = (Be,V); and
(iii) if Sk given e yields Si, then I(Sk) = (Bi,V) for some Bi where Bei = B.
Fit gives us an ideal. Imperfect fit can be cashed out in terms of how close a scheme
comes to satisfying this ideal. As far as the underdetermination argument is concerned,
we assume that typical agents do indeed satisfy the Bayesian theory I’ve just outlined,
so at least one perfectly fitting scheme is guaranteed to exist.
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2. The Underdetermination Argument
My cards are on the table: with the exception of Static Values, I think that the kind
of functionalism that I’ve been describing is basically right. Some tweaks are needed,
some idealisations need to be dropped, and quite a few details need to be worked out.
We’ve still got to deal with logical fallibility, essentially indexical content, imprecise
attitudes, and change in intrinsic values. If we want to spell the theory out in thorough-
going physicalist terms, we’ll also need to say a lot more about how we can get access to
the facts about evidence (cf. Pautz 2013; Williams 2019), and how options ought to be
characterised in relation to beliefs. In any case, though, I doubt that the main outlines are
going to change much. Whatever we end up with after crossing all the t’s and dotting all
the i’s should end up looking a lot like the kind of theory characterised by B-Eligibility,
V-Eligibility, %-Coherence, %-Maximisation, and Conditionalisation.
So that brings us to the underdetermination argument. According to Lewis, if one
scheme of interpretation maximises fit then there will always be others, and some of
these competing alternatives will differ radically from one another—that is, unless we
impose stronger eligibility constraints on the contents of beliefs and desires. Lewis only
very briefly sketches the argument for this in ‘New Work’, though most of the neglected
details have more recently been filled in by Schwarz (2012), Weatherson (2012: 5), and
Williams (2016). Here’s how it goes.
First, let G = {g1, ..., gn} designate the smallest partition of Ω such that any b in⋃(Bτ )τ∈T (i.e., all of the specific behaviour-propositions, across all of the times τ) plus
any e in E will be a member of the algebra of propositions generated by G, designated
A(G), and defined as the set of all propositions equal to the union of members of G:
A(G) =
{
p | ∃gi, ..., gj ∈ G : p = gi ∪ · · · ∪ gj
}
.
The upshot is that any disjunction of behaviour-specifying propositions—and hence any
option-specifying proposition—as well as any evidence-specifying proposition will belong
to A(G). Given this, the key assumption needed for the underdetermination result is
that there are propositions regarding which Typikarl can have non-trivial strengths of
belief and/or desire regarding propositions that do not belong to A(G). Since we’ve
assumed that Typikarl has beliefs regarding every proposition, this amounts to just
saying that some members of G contain more than one possible world.
An example will help to show where the argument goes from here. Suppose that for
some g in G, g = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. Now take some ‘decent, reasonable’ system of initial beliefs
and intrinsic values, (B1,V1). The specific numbers don’t really matter, so suppose:
B1({ωi}) =

0.1, if i = 1
0.2, if i = 2
0.3, if i = 3
V1(ωi) =

3, if i = 1
6, if i = 2
9, if i = 3
We now ‘twist’ B1 into a new probability distribution that assigns the same values to
every proposition in G; and we twist V1 ‘in a countervailing way’, so as to end up with
the same expected values for every proposition in G. For example,
B2({ωi}) =

0.3, if i = 1
0.3, if i = 2




7, if i = 1
7, if i = 2
5, if i = 3
V1(ωi) otherwise
11






More generally, from B-Eligibility, V-Eligibility, and %-Coherence, (B2,V2)
will determine the same strengths of belief and desire for all propositions in A(G).
Several things follow from this. First, since (B1,V1) and (B2,V2) must therefore deter-
mine the same expected values for any disjunction of behaviour propositions at any
time, they will also determine the same preferences over those propositions. So, by
%-Maximisation, they must determine the same choice dispositions over Typikarl’s
options (whatever those may be). Furthermore, the same holds even after conditional-
ising B1 and B2 on any evidence-specifying proposition in E—that is: for any such e,
(Be1,V1) and (Be2,V2) will also determine the same choice dispositions over Typikarl’s
options (whatever those may be). So by Conditionalisation plus Static Values, we
get the result that for all e, Si and Sj match the interpretations (B1,V1) and (Be1,V1)
respectively just in case they match (B2,V2) and (Be2,V2) respectively.
Given the definition of Fit, then, and assuming that there are no further constraints
on eligibility beyond those given by B-Eligibility, V-Eligibility, it follows that there
must be multiple competing schemes of interpretation each assigning perfectly eligible



















This establishes underdetermination with respect to any propositions not in A(G). We
get radical underdetermination by noting that Typikarl will have beliefs and/or desires
regarding numerous propositions not in A(G)—i.e., propositions that are not equivalent
to disjunctions of propositions specifying how he behaves and what evidence he receives
in what order—and that schemes which agree with respect to A(G) can vary wildly
with respect to propositions not in A(G).
(Do not misunderstand what Lewis’ argument teaches us. It does not tell us that the
evidence-and-choice facts determine the facts about Typikarl’s beliefs and desires up to
the propositions in A(G), but no further. If that were the case, then there would be no
further concerns about underdetermination if only G were maximally fine-grained—for
example, if we were to say that any proposition whatsoever could serve as the content
of Typikarl’s evidence, or if Typikarl really could choose to make any proposition true.
But, as we’ll see, making G more fine-grained won’t solve the problem. Lewis’ argument
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establishes that the evidence-and-choice facts at most determine Typikarl’s beliefs and
desires up to those propositions in the algebra generated by G. For all we’ve said so far,
though, the evidence-and-choice facts need not determine Typikarl’s beliefs and desires,
or even his preferences, for those propositions either.)
So how can we fix this? Lewis’ proposal was to suggest stronger eligibility constraints
than those that are entailed by B-Eligibility and V-Eligibility alone—constraints
based on substantive considerations of reasonableness:
We need further constraints, of the sort called principles of (sophisticated)
charity, or of ‘humanity’. Such principles call for interpretations according to
which the subject has attitudes that we would deem reasonable for one who
has lived the life that he has lived. These principles select among conflicting
interpretations that equally well conform to the principles of fit. (1983a: 375)
Continuing the example, suppose that (B1,V1) is a more reasonable than (B2,V2). S
matches the interpretation (B1,V1) just when it matches (B2,V2). A scheme that assigns
(B1,V1) to all such states will therefore be considered better overall, ceteris paribus, than
any scheme which assigns (B2,V2) to these states. The upshot is that the latter can never
be assigned to any physical state by the correct scheme (or schemes) of interpretation.
Some pairs of probability and value functions represent no genuinely possible belief-
desire state—they ‘can never be correctly assigned because, whenever [they] fit the
functional roles of the thinker’s states, some more favoured content also fits’ (1986: 108).
Lewis thought it likely that, with strengthened eligibility constraints in place, we
would be able to sufficiently narrow down the admissible schemes of interpretation. He
didn’t provide much of an argument for this; nor for that matter did he say very much
about what the eligibility requirements were supposed to be. But how exactly the solu-
tion is supposed to work and whether it’s successful is a topic for another paper. Let’s
turn now to representation theorems, and whether these have any interesting implica-
tions for Lewisean functionalism.
3. Representation Theorems and Lewisean Functionalism
Representation theorems for expected utility theory are often taken to supply us with
conditions under which we can derive the facts about an agent’s beliefs and desires once
we have enough information about her choice dispositions. There’s no small number
of these theorems—Peter Fishburn’s (1981) well-known review covers 28 of them, and
there’s been plenty more published in the four decades since.
I couldn’t hope to cover every relevant theorem in any detail here, so here’s what I’m
going to do. I’ll start by describing in a very generalised way the stereotypical representa-
tion theorem (§3.1). Then I’ll consider the suggestion that Lewisean underdetermination
is consistent with these theorems so long as we deny some of the ‘act-richness’ axioms
they rely on (§3.2). Finally, I’ll discuss the deeper reason why there’s no genuine conflict
between the underdetermination argument and the representation theorems (§3.3).
3.1 The stereotypical representation theorem
Any precisification of expected utility theory will do two things. First, it will impose
at least some minimal restrictions conditions on beliefs and desires—for example, that
the agent’s beliefs be coherent enough to be representable by a probability distribution.
Second, the theory will say that an agent’s preferences % will be determined by her
beliefs and intrinsic values according to (some version of) the expected utility rule.
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Given this, suppose we represent the content of the theory as a function, TEU, from
eligible systems of belief and desire to systems of preference; i.e.,
TEU : (β × δ) 7→ π,
where:
β = {B1,B2, ...} = the eligible systems of belief,
δ = {V1,V2, ...} = the eligible systems of intrinsic values, and
π = {%,%′, ...} = the possible systems of preference.
The stereotypical representation theorem for the theory TEU will then be:
Representation Theorem. If a system of preferences % satisfies axioms a1, ...,
an, then TEU(Bi,Vi) = TEU(Bj ,Vj) = % if and only if (Bi,Vi) = (Bj ,Vj).
The axioms a1, ..., an will include, for example, the requirement that % is transitive and
complete. I’ll say a bit more about some of the axioms in §3.2, but for now we can safely
ignore the specifics of what the a1, ..., an actually say.
Ramsey’s theorem takes the above form, and Savage’s does as well. Because of this,
they’re frequently taken to show that it’s possible to fix an agent’s beliefs and desires
given enough information about her choice dispositions. For this to be true, though, we
first need an appropriate theoretical connection between preferences and choice disposi-
tions. Something like %-Maximisation will tell us that agents choose whichever of their
options they consider best. If we know what the relevant options are, then observing
the agent’s actual choices at most tells us what she considers best from amongst those.
That’s a long way off from full information about her preferences, so more is needed.
Well, we know how to solve this one, right? According to a long-standing tradition,
counterfactual choices reveal preferences. Specifically,
Revealed Preference. If Typikarl has beliefs and desires (B,V), then for any
possible set of options O, if his options were O then he would be disposed to make
true any one of the options in O that he desires most.
In other words, Typikarl’s preferences correspond directly to his choice dispositions
under counterfactual hypotheses about his available options. Indeed, suppose we define
an Typikarl’s counterfactual choice ranking, %c, as follows: o1 %c o2 just in case, if o1
and o2 were Typikarl’s only options, then o1 is one of the options he would be disposed
to make true. If Revealed Preference is true, then (at least as far as the possible
options are concerned) Typikarl’s counterfactual choice ranking %c just is his preference
ranking %, more or less.8
3.2 Underdetermination and act-richness
So here’s where we’re at: if there’s an appropriately tight connection between choice
dispositions and preferences, of the kind given by Revealed Preference, then it’s
plausible enough to say that a result like Representation Theorem describes suf-
ficient conditions for when the facts about an agent’s choice dispositions can uniquely
8 Revealed Preference tells us that (for possible options o1, o2), o1 % o2 implies o1 %c o2. The
other direction is trickier, since % need not be complete. However, at least in Typikarl’s case, % is
complete over those o such that B(o) > 0; for any remaining possible options, Revealed Preference
entails they’ll be minimal in %c. Hence, o1 %c o2 implies o1 % o2 if neither o1 nor o2 is bottom ranked
in %c; otherwise o1 and o2 aren’t %-related. In sum: %c is %, more or less.
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determine the facts about her beliefs and desires. And this is exactly the kind of thing
that you’d think a Bayesian functionalist ought to be very interested in, especially when
facing off against a problem of radical underdetermination. There can be no reasonable
doubt that Lewis would have been aware of Ramsey’s and Savage’s theorems by the
time he was writing ‘New Work’. So why did he never mention them?
Let me with two answers that I don’t think get to the heart of the issue. (Readers
not interested in the details can skip to §3.3 without loss of comprehension.)
First, as Schwarz (2012) and Williams (2016) have both pointed out, the underde-
termination argument in ‘New Work’ presupposes Jeffrey’s (1965) decision theory. And,
famously, on Jeffrey’s theory preferences do not suffice to determine unique beliefs and
desires—instead, Jeffrey’s theorem only establishes axioms under which TEU(Bi,Vi) =
TEU(Bj ,Vj) = % if and only if (Bi,Vi) and (Bj ,Vj) are related by a fractional linear
transformation. So there’s already underdetermination of belief and desire by preference
in this version of expected utility theory. Lewis’ conclusion is nothing new to report.9
Now, there’s a good sense in which this is all correct: Lewis’ conclusion is that
there is underdetermination; his argument for this presupposes Jeffrey’s theory, and the
representation theorem for Jeffrey’s theory admits underdetermination; hence, Lewis’
conclusion is consistent with the relevant theorem—indeed, it’s ‘old news’. With that
said, and as Schwarz (2012) rightly points out, it clearly wasn’t Lewis’ intent for his
argument to rest on the specifics of Jeffrey’s theory—and more importantly, we have
good reasons to think that it doesn’t. Williams (2016) shows how to get the same kind
of underdetermination result for Lewis’ (1981) causal decision theory, while (Elliott
2017a) contains much the same style of argument applied to a wide class of ‘Savagean’
decision theories. In both cases, the upshot is the same: an agent’s choices over options
might at most determine her preferences up to a limited subset of the propositions
regarding which she has beliefs and desires, but for the remaining propositions we have
underdetermination. So Lewis’ conclusion seems to be quite robust against variations in
the decision theory being applied. The conclusion is perfectly consistent with Jeffrey’s
representation theorem, but that’s not yet getting at the heart of the matter.
The second suggestion is trickier to deal with. In his (2014: 21–2), Schwarz states that
‘Lewis did not trust these [representation theorem] results’. Schwarz pins that distrust on
the fact that amongst the axioms a1, ..., an that Savage, Ramsey, et al., use to prove their
uniqueness results there will usually be some implausibly strong requirements relating
to the ‘richness’ of space of options over which the agent’s choice ranking is defined.
(See also Schwarz 2012; 2015: 513; Williams 2016: 430 suggests something similar.) If
this is right, then you can see one easy way to reconcile Lewis’ conclusion with Savage’s
and Ramsey’s results: if the axioms a1, ..., an needed to ensure a unique representation
are never jointly satisfied, then Representation Theorem doesn’t provide us with
reasons to believe that choices can uniquely determine beliefs and desires.
But I don’t think this gets us to the heart of the matter either. Lewis certainly might
have rejected these domain-richness axioms—a great many others have! But even if we
take an agent’s space of options to be arbitrarily rich, there would still be no direct
conflict between Lewis’ conclusion and theorems like Ramsey’s and Savage’s. This is
9 Of course, the (B1,V1) and (B2,V2) in the example of §2 aren’t related by a fractional linear
transformation either. But it’s easy to see that this, too, is entirely consistent with Jeffrey’s representation
result: since A(G) is a proper sub-algebra of ℘(Ω), if the evidence-and-choice facts can be taken to
determine no more than % over A(G), then Jeffrey’s theorem at most establishes that Typikarl’s beliefs
and desires over A(G) can be determined up to a fractional linear transformation, and might be much
more radically underdetermined for the remainder.
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what I’ll argue below. Right now, let me first say why it’s not obvious that Lewis would
have rejected these domain-richness assumptions.
We’ll focus on Savage. Savage’s formalisation of expected utility theory starts off
with two partitions: a set of states, and a set of consequences that specify ways the
world might be in as much detail as makes a difference to what we care about. Think
of the consequences as sets of equally-desirable worlds. From there, Savage defines his
preference relation over total functions from states to consequences, each intended to
represent a distinct act. If an act-function takes us from state s1 to consequence c1, s2
to c2, and so on, then that function represents the act such that if it’s chosen and s1,
then c1 results; if it’s chosen and s2, c2 results, and so on. So far so good. But one of the
axioms that Savage uses to prove his uniqueness result requires that every act-function
represents a distinct act. This implies, amongst other things, the existence of so-called
constant acts—acts with the same consequence regardless of what state happens to be
true—which has long been a focal point of criticism for Savage’s theorem. (See, for
example, Fishburn 1981: 162; Maher 1993: 182–5; Joyce 1999: 107–8.) Would Lewis have
rejected Savage’s assumption too?
Before we answer that, we should get clear on just what the constant acts problem
is. First, if Savage was assuming that every act-function represents an available act—
something the decision-maker could choose to perform in their current circumstances—
then it’s highly unlikely that there’s an act available to me that will bring about any level
of value I so care to choose. But it’s also unlikely that this is what Savage had in mind. If
every constant act were an option then any minimally rational agent would just choose
the constant act that guarantees the best consequence come what may (Joyce 1999: 67).
Savage’s theorem would be relevant only to omnipotent gods can directly choose any
consequence at will, and that’s clearly not how Savage understood the import of his
work. More importantly, the Revealed Preference methodology doesn’t require us
to consider only the available acts. After all, if we’re going to be talking about what
Typikarl would choose given counterfactual option sets, then why would we restrict our-
selves to his available acts? Typikarl still has preferences over possible-but-not-available
acts, and dispositions to choose between them if they were to become available.
Ok—but isn’t the problem that some constant acts won’t even be possible? Well,
that depends on what the space of consequences looks like. On the one hand, imagine
that Typikarl has extremely opinionated intrinsic values: he assigns a distinct value to
each and every possible world. There would then almost certainly be at least one world
ω such that each act Typikarl performs within that world is also performed within some
other world. It follows immediately that there are no possible acts that are guaranteed
to result in something exactly as valuable as ω. So for some ways of carving up the
consequences, corresponding to some ways an agent’s intrinsic values might be, Savage’s
act-richness axiom does entail the existence of impossible acts. On the other hand,
suppose that Typikarl doesn’t care about very much at all—say, there are only two or
three relevantly distinct consequences as far as he’s concerned. Then it’s very plausible
that there’s going to be some way of carving up the states such that for each consequences
there’s at least one possible act that guarantees that consequence regardless of which
state happens to be true.
As a general rule of thumb, the more fine-grained the consequence-partition, the less
likely it will be that there exists a set of states such that every function from states to
consequences corresponds to a possible act. Because most of us usually do care about
quite a lot of things, Savage’s assumption is problematic. That’s the problem of constant
acts. But the flip-side of this is that the more coarse-grained the consequences are, the
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more plausible Savage’s act-richness assumption becomes. And, crucially, the axioms
a1, ..., an of Savage’s theorem do not require the consequence-partition to be extremely
fine-grained—and neither does the underdetermination argument require any special
assumptions about how opinionated Typikarl’s intrinsic values can be.
The upshot here is that there are cases where Lewis’ argument seems to apply but
for which we’ve no special reason to reject Savage’s act-richness axiom. So whatever it
is that’s going on between Lewis’ argument and Savage’s theorem, it’s not—or is not
only—a disagreement over the richness of the act-space. We’re going to need something
more general than this if we’re going to reconcile the two.10
3.3 The source of underdetermination
To apply a result like Representation Theorem to Typikarl’s case we need an ap-
propriate theoretical link between his behaviour and his preferences. If Typikarl’s pref-
erences can be simply read off of his counterfactual choice ranking, then the application
is straightforward. But at no point is this how Lewis describes things.
Here’s a typical instance of what Lewis says about the kind of information relating
to choice and behaviour that we have for the purposes of radical interpretation:
Thus if [the physical facts entail] that Karl’s arm goes up at a certain time,
[we] should ascribe beliefs and desires according to which it’s a good thing
for his arm to go up then. I would hope to spell this out in decision-theoretic
terms, as follows. Take a suitable set of mutually exclusive and jointly ex-
haustive propositions about Karl’s behaviour at any given time; of these
alternatives, the one that comes true according to [the physical facts] should
be the one (or: one of the ones) with maximum expected utility according
to the total system of beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl at that time...
(1974: 337, emphasis added; see also 1983a: 374; 1986: 36ff)
That is, the physical facts supply us not a ranking over a space of propositions, but
a single proposition about his behaviour that entails (one of) the option(s) that Karl
considers best given his beliefs and desires. In a later work, Lewis adds more detail:
... what makes it be so that a certain reasonable initial credence function and
a certain reasonable system of basic intrinsic values are both yours is that
you are disposed to act in more or less the ways that are rationalized by the
pair of them together, taking into account the modification of credence by
conditionalizing on total evidence; and further, you would have been likewise
disposed if your life history of experience, and consequent modification of
credence, had been different ... (1980b: 287–8, emphasis added)
So in Typikarl’s case, for each time τ we know:
i) which evidence-specifying e characterises Typikarl’s sensory evidence up to τ ,
ii) which behaviour-specifying b Typikarl makes true at τ , and (more generally),
iii) which b′ he would have made true if he were to have had some other history of
sensory evidence e′ instead.
10 In addition to the points above, it’s worth noting that while Savage used the assumption that every
act-function represents a possible act, it appears that this assumption can be weakened. More recent
theorems which closely follow the structure of Savage’s own manage to establish conditions sufficient for
unique expected utility representations without assuming anything quite as strong (e.g., Abdellaoui and
Wakker 2005; Gaifman and Liu 2018).
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Note that I’ve been saying ‘behaviours’ for a reason—not ‘options’. Whatever behaviour
he performs at a time must entail an option o that is amongst those options he desires
most at that time. But since what counts as Typikarl’s options depends in part on
his beliefs, we cannot in general presume to know which options Typikarl is choosing
between given just the physical facts.
So let’s make a distinction. On the one hand there’s the matter of what options an
agent would choose if her options were thus-and-so. We’ll call these o-counterfactual
choices. These are the kinds of facts about choices that get ‘encoded’ in a counterfactual
choice ranking if Revealed Preference is true. On the other hand, there’s how an
agent would behave if her evidence were thus-and-so. We’ll call these e-counterfactual
choices. The facts about e-counterfactual choices are the kinds of facts that Lewis
thought would be available for the purposes of radical interpretation. So the question
for us now is: if we knew enough about Typikarl’s e-counterfactual choices, as well as his
actual evidence and behaviour, then would this be enough to determine his preferences?
(Spoiler alert: they won’t be.)
Lewis argued that any given pattern of e-counterfactual choices can be consistent
with multiple hypotheses about initial beliefs and desires. That argument made use
of some idiosyncratic aspects of Jeffrey’s decision theory, as well as some assumptions
about the ‘grain’ of the sets ⋃(Bτ )τ∈T and E, but there are some more general reasons
to think that e-counterfactual choices will underdetermine preferences. Let’s get three
of the obvious ones out of the way first:
1. What behaviours Typikarl performs will depend on what his options he is choosing
between, which in turn depends at least in part on his beliefs. Consequently, it might
not be possible to know what Typikarl’s options are until we first know his beliefs,
and if we cannot know his options then we cannot determine his preferences over
those options merely from the facts about his behaviour.
2. Even if we knew what Typikarl’s options are, his performing a behaviour b that
entails the option o might indicate that he uniquely prefers o above the alternatives,
or it might only indicate that he considers o one of the best.
3. Even if we assume there are never any ties for equal best, observing Typikarl’s
choices at a time will let us determine which options he considers best at that time,
but won’t help us draw comparisons between options across different times.
The first of these relates to a long-standing problem for using behavioural information to
determine preferences in the absence of assumptions about belief, and is usually discussed
in connection with revealed preference theory (e.g., Hausman 2000; 2012: 27ff; Thoma
forthcoming). The second concerns another long-standing problem with behaviourally
distinguishing preference from indifference (cf. Savage 1954: 17; Maher 1993: 12–4). The
third is a unique problem that arises from when we appeal to e-counterfactual choices,
as opposed to o-counterfactual choices, to gather information about preferences.
All three are important potential sources of underdetermination that Lewis would
likely have been aware of, but they are not the ones I want to focus on. Consequently,
let’s assume for the sake of argument (per impossibile) that
1. we can know what Typikarl’s options are despite not knowing his beliefs,
2. Typikarl is never indifferent between any options, and
3. any option is available for Typikarl to choose at any given time.
Even given these recklessly implausible assumptions, still Typikarl’s e-counterfactual
choices won’t determine his preferences.
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Suppose that Typikarl’s options are O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}, and that he ranks these o1 
o2  o3  o4. In order to ‘extract’ these preferences from Typikarl’s e-counterfactual
choices, we will need the appropriate propositions about Typikarl’s evidence to exist in
E—specifically, we need e that line up nicely with the appropriate restrictions on his
options O. Here’s what I mean by that. Typikarl will choose o1 from O, but we still
need to know how he ranks the sub-maximal options, so we need to give him evidence
that o1 is unavailable. It would suffice to consider either:
i) Typikarl’s choices after conditionalising on o2 ∪ o3 ∪ o4 (to determine o2  o3 and
o2  o4), and after conditionalising on o3 ∪ o4 (to determine o3  o4); or
ii) Typikarl’s choices after conditionalising on o2 ∪ o3 (to determine o2  o3), and after
conditionalising on o3 ∪ o4 (to determine o3  o4).
If we have Typikarl conditionalise on anything else, then we run the risk of distorting the
results. (For example, if e entails the negation of o1 but cross-cuts o2, o3, and o4, then
Typikarl’s choices after updating on e won’t necessarily tell us what he prefers between
o2, o3, and o4, only what he prefers between e ∩ o2, e ∩ o3, and e ∩ o4.) And that’s a
problem, because we’re unlikely to find any of the propositions o2∪o3∪o4, or o2∪o3, or
o3∪o4, in E. After all, the evidence-specifying propositions are supposed to characterise
in full detail the content of Typikarl’s sensory evidence over some period of time. So e
will tell us what sights and sounds and tastes and so on Typikarl experiences in what
sequence, and if he doesn’t experience any sights or sounds at some point, then that will
be entailed by e as well. No proposition with that content is going to be equivalent to a
disjunction of propositions about how Typikarl behaves at some time.
Note that this problem arises even if we assume that the space of options is arbitrar-
ily rich—indeed, the richer the space of options available, the more evidence-specifying
propositions we’ll need in E if we’re to use Typikarl’s e-counterfactual choices to de-
termine his preferences over those options. And there’s a further problem still if we
assume that every proposition can count as an option or as evidence. For if Typikarl
can choose to make any proposition true, then he will always just choose to make true
whichever world ω has maximal value. After conditionalising on e, then if e contains ω
he’ll choose ω; otherwise he’ll choose whichever world ω′ is most valuable in e. In this
case, with a rich enough E we could use Typikarl’s e-counterfactual choices to determine
his preferences over (singleton sets of) worlds, but this will radically underdetermine his
preferences over the full suite of propositions regarding which he has beliefs and desires.
Contrast all this with the Revealed Preference method for extracting prefer-
ences from Typikarl’s o-counterfactual choices. If we allow ourselves to stipulate arbi-
trary hypotheses about Typikarl’s options, then we can say, for example, that his options
are exactly {p,¬p}, and thus determine Typikarl’s preferences between p and ¬p. By
contrast, if we start off saying that Typikarl’s possible options can include any propo-
sitions whatsoever, then for any e the options that Typikarl would take to be available
after conditionalising on e will include all subsets of e. This means that there is no e we
can have him update on such that he’s left believing his options are exactly {p,¬p}—for
if e = p ∪¬p then his beliefs won’t change at all; whereas if e ⊂ p ∪¬p then his options
won’t be p and ¬p but rather p ∩ e and ¬p ∩ e plus every other subset of e. So making
the space of options richer won’t solve the problem of underdetermination.
The above are all different ways of getting at a very general reason why Typikarl’s e-
counterfactual choices underdetermine his preferences. If you want to extract preferences
over some space of options O from the facts about choices, then you need to consider
choices between specific subsets of those options. That’s key to how the Revealed
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Preference methodology is supposed to work. But we cannot apply the same method
with e-counterfactual choices, because we won’t find the right evidence-specifying propo-
sitions, corresponding to appropriate restrictions in the option set, for Typikarl to con-
ditionalise on. The problem isn’t—or isn’t only—the ‘richness’ of the space of options,
nor is it just about what kind of propositions can serve as evidence. The problem is that
the facts about e-counterfactual choices just don’t contain the right kind of information
from which sufficient information about preferences can be extracted.
So here, I think, is the deeper reason why there’s no conflict between Lewisean
underdetermination and a result like Representation Theorem. The latter entails
that under the right conditions a1, ..., an, Typikarl’s preferences % will be uniquely
determined relative to some expected utility theory TEU by some system of beliefs and
desires (B,V). If we combine this with Revealed Preference, then there will exist
some %c such that
TEU(Bi,Vi) = TEU(Bj ,Vj) = %c → (Bi,Vi) = (Bj ,Vj).
But the content of folk psychology isn’t given by TEU, and it doesn’t include Revealed
Preference (as I’ll argue soon). Instead, the folk psychological theory tells us that if a
typical agent were to start off with beliefs and desires (B,V), then if she were to receive
evidence e she would be disposed to behave in some way b that entails some option o
that has maximal expected value relative to (Be,V). The content of the theory is not
given by TEU, but better represented by
TFP : (β × δ × T) 7→
{







Specifically, TFP(B,V, τ) picks out a function F that represents a specific pattern of
actual and e-counterfactual choices, taking us from the evidence e compatible with B to
the set of behaviours available at the later time τ + e that entail some option in Oτ+eBe
that maximises expected value relative to (Be,V), where ‘τ+e’ is τ plus the whatever the
duration of e happens to be. And for all that a result like Representation Theorem
might tell us, there need not be any F such that
TFP(Bi,Vi, τ) = TEU(Bj ,Vj , τ) = F → (Bi,Vi) = (Bj ,Vj).
Moreover, we’ve just seen several reasons to think that such an F won’t exist. There is
no conflict with Representation Theorem. There is underdetermination.
Lewis’ conclusion was that the evidence-and-choice facts won’t determine Typikarl’s
beliefs and desires for any propositions outside of A(G). What I’ve been arguing now
is that the evidence-and-choice facts won’t determine Typikarl’s beliefs and desires over
the propositions within A(G) either. The underdetermination is worse than we thought.
Even if we make the partition G maximally fine-grained—whether by letting any propo-
sition count as evidence, or by enriching Typikarl’s space of options beyond all sense of
plausibility, or both—still we can expect plenty of underdetermination of the belief-and-
desire facts by the evidence-and-choice facts on the Lewisean functionalist theory. At
best, Typikarl’s e-counterfactual choices will help us to determine bits and pieces of his
preferences over A(G), but the majority of his preference ranking will not be ‘revealed’
no matter how much we know about his evidence and his e-counterfactual choices.
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4. Representation Theorems and Radical Interpretation
Finally, we should talk about the elephant in the room: even if the Lewisean theory
of radical interpretation makes no reference to o-counterfactual choices, an alternative
theory might do so. Nothing I’ve said so far entails that we can’t or shouldn’t use the facts
about an agent’s o-counterfactual choices to pin down the facts about her preferences
and, on that basis and given the appropriate representation theorem, determine her
beliefs and desires. After all, if we can help ourselves to one kind of counterfactual, then
why not help ourselves to the other kind as well?
Well, not so fast. Extracting information about preferences from information about
o-counterfactual choices requires something like Revealed Preference to mediate
the inference, so first we need to consider whether that thesis is something we ought to
accept. For if not, then representation theorems don’t tell us how to determine beliefs
and desires given choices on any plausible theory of radical interpretation.
We should reject Revealed Preference. As in the previous section, in arguing
for this I will set aside some common concerns that arise when we try to determine
preferences between options on the basis of facts about behaviour. These are well-known
epistemic problems with the standard methodology of revealed preference theory, but
they aren’t reasons to reject the Revealed Preference thesis itself. Consequently,
we’ll assume again that we can know what Typikarl’s options are even if we don’t
know his beliefs and how he conceives of his options, and we’ll assume that he’s never
indifferent between any options. The real problem with Revealed Preference isn’t
methodological, it’s that the thesis is false: the idea that o-counterfactual choices ‘reveal’
actual preferences just doesn’t fit well with any plausible theory of belief update.11
In any realistic decision situation, there’s going to be a very wide range of available
options an agent might choose between. We ignore most of these when drawing up a
decision table, but instead of just going out for Thai food versus going out for Italian,
one could for example dance around like a chicken or sing a Springsteen power ballad.
So, imagine that the options from which Typikarl can actually choose between are given
by O = {o∅, o1, ..., o100}, with
o1  o2  ...  o99  o100
%-Maximisation and Revealed Preference each predict that o1 will be chosen.
But now let’s go to the counterfactual scenario where his options are given by, let’s
say, O? = {o83, o84}. %-Maximisation makes no predictions about what Typikarl would
do in this scenario—that principle tells us how Typikarl will choose amongst his options
given his preferences; it does not tell us how Typikarl would choose if his options were
thus and so given that his preferences actually thus and so. After all, it’s entirely consis-
tent with %-Maximisation that Typikarl’s preferences in the counterfactual scenario
are vastly different than his actual preferences. Revealed Preference, on the other
hand, predicts that Typikarl will choose o83. So now consider: are Typikarl’s beliefs and
values the same in counterfactual as they are in the actual scenario?
If his beliefs and desires remain the same across the two scenarios, then whence the
change in behaviour? In the actual scenario he chooses o1 on the basis of his beliefs and
11 An argument similar to the one I’m about to make here is also made by Hausman (2012: 31–3).
For some reason, it seems to have been neglected in responses to that work. To my mind it points to a
much deeper problem with revealed preference theory than the observation (also in Hausman 2012: 27ff)
that we cannot determine preferences over options from observations of behaviour in the absence of
hypotheses about belief—which is what defences of revealed preference theory have focused on so far.
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desires; in the counterfactual he purportedly chooses o83, but somehow his beliefs don’t
change? But what else could plausibly explain the difference in what’s chosen aside from
a change in beliefs about what choices are available? Surely we don’t want to posit that
Typikarl has some magical means of direct access to what options are available to choose
between, which informs his behaviour without in any way affecting his beliefs.
No: if there’s a difference in Typikarl’s behaviour across the different scenarios, then
the most plausible explanation is that his beliefs have changed—presumably, by learning
about the restrictions to his option set. If that’s the case, though, then it matters a great
deal exactly how Typikarl’s beliefs change in the new scenario. After all, imagine coming
to believe that the (usually very large) range of options that you thought you had to
choose between has been reduced down to exactly two. I’d imagine this would involve a
significant change in your beliefs, since the nearest possible world where anything like
that could be true would be quite far off indeed. So Typikarl’s beliefs in such strange
circumstances are not likely to be much like his beliefs in the actual world. And if they’re
not, then why think his o-counterfactual choices have any strong connection to what’s
going on inside his head in the actual world?
Here’s a more precise way to put that point. Assume that Typikarl’s intrinsic values
never change. We don’t know what his beliefs and desires are, except that they’re given
by some (B,V) and that o83  o84. In this case, we can be certain that Typikarl will
choose o83 in the scenario where his options are restricted to {o83, o84} only if we can be
certain that his beliefs in that scenario will be given by B conditionalised on o83∪o84. But
what Typikarl knows in the counterfactual is not I will choose o83 or o84, but the much
stronger proposition o83 and o84 are the only options available. And there’s a very big
difference between coming to believe o83 ∪ o84 under the supposition that he could have
chosen any of o1 through to o100, versus coming to believe that o83 and o84 exhaust the
extent of his choices. The latter requires a major rethink of the causal structure of the
world, so his counterfactual beliefs aren’t likely to be very similar to B conditionalised
on o83 ∪ o84.
So the truth of Revealed Preference seems to require either that decision-
makers’ choices to magically reflect changes in the option set despite no changes in
their beliefs, or implausible assumptions about how we would update our beliefs upon
learning that our options have been severely restricted. The thesis is plausible enough
if we consider only ‘minor’ restrictions to the option set, and cases where we can rea-
sonably assume that the decision-maker’s beliefs won’t change too much if we take away
some of their options. But that’s not going to be enough for the purposes of radical
interpretation, where we will want to know the decision-maker’s preferences over a rich
space of options. For the general case, then, Revealed Preference isn’t remotely
plausible, and it seems that o-counterfactual choices don’t determine preferences either.
5. Conclusion
I promised to answer two questions:
(i) How do representation theorems like Savage’s and Ramsey’s relate to Lewis’ under-
determination argument?
(ii) Are there any plausible theories of radical interpretation under which these theorems
show that beliefs and desires are (sometimes) determined by choice dispositions?
For the first, the answer is ‘they don’t really’. The representation theorems tell us that
it might be possible to determine an agent’s beliefs and desires given enough knowledge
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about her preferences—but we’re never going to have enough information about the
agent’s preferences given just the facts about choices, since preferences are underde-
termined by e-counterfactual choices. For the second question, the answer is ‘probably
not’. An agent’s e-counterfactual choices underdetermine her preferences, and her o-
counterfactual choices determine her preferences only under implausible assumptions.
It’s not all doom and gloom for the representation theorems. If your philosophical
project is to reduce some intentional states to other intentional states, then a result
like Representation Theorem might be quite useful indeed. For the same reason,
functionalists might find them interesting for what they tell us about the internal psy-
chological relationships between beliefs, intrinsic values, and preferences. But the target
of our discussion has been what representation theorems tell us about the relationship
between our attitudes and our choices, and what we can learn about the former given
only information about the latter. Theorems like Ramsey’s and Savage’s simply don’t
tell us how it’s possible to determine an agent’s beliefs and desires given her choice
dispositions under any plausible theory.
Appendix
I’ve said that I think Lewis was right about underdetermination, but there were several
important simplifications that went into the underdetermination argument presented in
§2. In this short appendix, I’ll discuss several of these simplifications and why I don’t
think they matter too much to truth of the conclusion.
First: obviously, B-Eligibility, V-Eligibility, %-Coherence, Conditionalisa-
tion, and %-Maximisation are all highly idealised, even in relation to typical agents.
But we can reasonably expect that the underdetermination argument will be robust
against various ways of ‘de-idealising’ Bayesianism. For example, the argument doesn’t
hinge on B and V assigning precise numerical values, nor does it require that either B or
V be coherent beyond what’s strictly necessary to make sense of the decision and updat-
ing rules. If anything, allowing for more variety in the kinds of beliefs and desires that
can considered possible—e.g., by allowing for the possibility of imprecise and probabilis-
tically incoherent systems of belief—will only make the degree of underdetermination
worse. Likewise, it’s a consequence of %-Coherence, %-Maximisation, Condition-
alisation, and Static Values that Typikarl’s choices over time are determined by his
initial beliefs, intrinsic values, and evidence. That’s implausible. But weakening these
constraints isn’t likely to help—the fewer constraints there are on transitions between
states, the worse we can expect the underdetermination to be.
Second: Static Values isn’t very plausible, but it does play an important role in the
underdetermination argument. Interestingly, how we go about denying Static Values
can make a difference to the conclusion. If we simply say that Typikarl’s intrinsic values
may randomly change sometimes, then the result will be fewer constraints on transitions
between states, and hence we’d expect to see a greater degree of underdetermination.
On the other hand, suppose that Typikarl’s values might systematically change in a way
that depends in part on his beliefs and/or desires. Lewis’ argument rests on the idea that
for any (B1,V1) there will be a (B2,V2) that not only generates the same preferences
over options, but also leads to the same preferences over future options for any sequence
of evidence. However, if V1 and V2 might evolve in different and predictable ways due
to differences in B1 and B2, then they might lead to divergent predictions about choices
and we’d be able to tell (B1,V1) and (B2,V2) apart.
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(As a rough example of what I mean here, suppose that if Typikarl is confident that
p = Typikarl is a loving relationship with Karl, then over time he’ll assign increasingly
more value to those worlds where Karl is well-off; and if, on the other hand, he’s not
confident that p, then his values for those worlds won’t change. At the start of his
relationship with Karl there might be two systems of belief and desire that perfectly
rationalise Typikarl’s choices: a ‘reasonable’ one according to which he’s confident that
p, and a ‘deviant’ counter-inductive interpretation according to which the more time he
spends with Karl the less confidence he has that p is true. The ‘reasonable’ and ‘deviant’
interpretations will then diverge in the choices they predict at later times due to the
systematic change in values.)
But I doubt this will significantly affect the conclusion. To the extent that it’s typical
for intrinsic values to change over time, those changes probably aren’t wholly random—
but at the same time it strikes me as unlikely that they change with the required kind of
systematicity needed to completely undermine Lewis’ conclusion. So I suspect that even
if Static Values were replaced with something more plausible, we could still expect
to see significant underdetermination.
The third and final limitation to Lewis’ argument that I’ll discuss concerns how
schemes of interpretation are understood. As Lewis (1983b: 119) notes, the correct
scheme of interpretation should specify an agent’s beliefs and desires as a function of her
momentary total physical state. But there are different ways this scheme might work.
One involves what we might call coarse-grained schemes, which assign total systems of
belief-desire (B,V) directly to total physical states depending on how well those states
fit the functional role of (B,V) considered as a whole. This is the kind of scheme that
Lewis makes use of for his argument in ‘New Work’. An alternative would be to use a
fine-grained scheme that assigns sub-total mental states to partial physical states. For
example, the fine-grained scheme I might have us identify the total state S with (B,V)
not directly because S satisfies the functional role of (B,V), but because S = S1 t S2,
and S1 satisfies the role of B while S2 satisfies the role of V.
This distinction matters because coarse-grained schemes of interpretation ignore
causal and counterfactual relationships between sub-total mental states. Here’s an ex-
ample. Let (B1,V1) and (B2,V2) be as they were described in §2. The functional role
of the total belief-desire state (B1,V1) is isomorphic to the functional role of (B2,V2).
That’s what Lewis’ underdetermination argument establishes, and it’s why the best fit-
ting coarse-grained schemes will underdetermine whether a total physical state S should
be assigned (B1,V1) or (B2,V2). However, for all we’ve said so far, the functional role of
B1 need not be isomorphic to the functional role of B2; nor need it be the case that the







and thus (B1,V1) generates the same expected values over options as (B3,V3). But these






So under recombinations with the values V1 and V2, B1 and B2 generate distinct expected
values for at least some propositions in A(G), and hence at least in principle might end
up generating different patterns of choice dispositions when combined with the same
systems of intrinsic value.
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More generally, say that B′ is a permutation of B just in case B′ rearranges the
values B assigns to (singleton sets of) worlds in the g ∈ G. Define permutations for
value functions similarly. Now let the recombination function RBV select for each p in
A(G) the set of expected desirabilities assigned to p by those (B′,V ′) such that B′ is a
permutation of B and V ′ is a permutation of V. With a finite space of worlds it turns




That is: any two systems of beliefs (or intrinsic values) that aren’t permutations of
one another will generate a distinctive pattern of expected desirabilities for some p in
A(G) when combined with different systems of value (beliefs). And that’s interesting,
because—as Williams (2016) points out—most of the underdetermination that’s estab-
lished by the argument in §2 isn’t between permutations.12
But I don’t think these facts will do much to allay the worries about underdetermi-
nation. First, while B1 and B2 generate different patterns of expected values for some
of the propositions in A(G) under recombination, this doesn’t yet entail they will gen-
erate different preferences over options; still less does it entail that they will generate
different (e-counterfactual) choices. More importantly, we cannot use recombinations to
distinguish between permutations. For example, even if we use fine-grained schemes of
interpretation we still won’t be able to distinguish between (B1,V1) and (B3,V3):
B3({ωi}) =

0.3, if i = 1
0.2, if i = 2




9, if i = 1
6, if i = 2
3, if i = 3
V1(ωi) otherwise
The functional role of B1 is isomorphic to the functional role of B3, and likewise for V1 and
V3. So while we might be able to use recombinations to tell (B1,V1) and (B2,V2) apart,
this won’t help us to distinguish between (B1,V1) and (B3,V3). The underdetermination
result holds, though it might not be quite as radical as the argument of §2 makes it out
to be.
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